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Lessing tells us in an introductory preface that The 
Golden Notebook breaks that form; it points to "all 
that complexity" that the outer novel omits. In 
this paper I have tried to indicate some of the 
complexity which" academic writing" can edit 
out. 
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TEACHER EDUCATION FOR VALUES EDUCATION: IS THERE A WAY 
FORWARD UNDER CURRENT CONSTRAINTS? 
Graham Haydon 
Institute of Education 
University of London 
How can teacher education best prepare teachers 
to contribute to values education in schools? 
Ifthis was ever a question that could be asked and 
answered in the abstract, or with reference to 
some postulated ideal situation, it is not so now. I 
am raising and suggesting an answer to the 
question in the context of recent developments in 
education in Britain; but since those recent 
developments are by no means unique to Britain, 
the discussion may well be of broader relevance 
too. 
The context, then, in which I am raising the 
question is one of increasing political control, at a 
national level, over both the curriculum of 
schools, and the form and content of teacher 
education itself. Several developments have 
combined, in Britain, which make it difficult to be 
optimistic about the future of any serious values 
education in schools; but at the same time, some 
opportunities have been opened up which could 
be grasped by teacher educators. 
I shall set the context first in terms of the school 
curriculum itself; then in terms of developments 
in teacher education. 
When the National Curriculum for England and 
Wales was first sketched out in 1987, one of the 
many negative reactions to it was the thought that 
it would involve little more than the transmission 
of a predetermined syllabus in each of a defined 
list of subjects; possibilities for pupils' own 
involvement in their learning, for their 
exploration of and critical reflection on matters 
concerning their own lives - for, indeed, the whole 
area which often goes under the label of Personal 
and Social Education - looked distinctly limited. 
Five years later, after many syllabus materials and 
guidelines have appeared, there has been no lack 
of reference to the need for pupils to engage with 
questions of values; on the other hand, there are 
indications that, at least in the view of 
government, there is no need to take these 
references too seriously. 
There has been room for such discrepancies to 
arise because of the distinction between what is 
statutory and what exists merely in guidelines; 
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an~ because of the complexity in ,the way in 
whIch both statutory provisions and guidelines 
are arrived at. In some cases, syllabus proposals 
which gave some emphasis to questions of values 
(e.g. in the treatment of environmental questions 
as they arise both in geography and in science) 
have been watered down before reaching their 
final statutory form; in other cases there was 
never any intention that certain proposals should 
have statutory status. At the time of the 
Education Reform Act, 1988, a National 
Curriculum Council (NCC) was set up, with a 
remit to make recommendations concerning the 
whole curriculum. Part of the NCe's activity has 
been to recommend a set of cross-curricular 
themes, and to issue guidelines for them. More 
will be said about these themes below; but one 
thing which they are held to have in common is 
that they provide an opportunity for the 
exploration of values and beliefs. The provision 
of these cross-curricular themes within a school's 
curriculum, however, is not required by law. 
The position at the time of writing, then, is that a 
pile of documents exists, within which quite 
frequent references are made to value issues; but 
how far the aspirations behind these references 
will be realised in schools is quite another 
question. It is also true that the aspiration that 
questions of values should enter into the school 
curriculum is often not made very specific. 
Statements such as the following, from Guidance 
documents on cross-curricular themes issued by 
the NCC, are typical: 
a. [Pupils should] 'Discuss moral values and 
explore those held by different cultures and 
groups' NCC document, Curriculum Guidance 
5, Health Education, p. 16. 
b. 'Schools should ensure, where relevant, that 
there is a balanced presentation of opposing 
views. Pupils should be encouraged to 
explore values and beliefs, both their own and 
those of others.' NCC document, Curriculum 
GlIidance 4, EducatiOll for Economic and 
Industrial Understanding, p. 3. 
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c. 'Schools should consider how and when to 
help pupils, between the ages of 5 and 16, 
develop .... concern for human rights .... ' ibid. 
p.5. 
d. 'These aims will help to promote .... 
knowledge of self - qualities, attitudes, values, 
abilities, strengths, limitations, potential and 
needs' NCC document, Curriculum Guidance 6, 
Careers Education, p. 2. 
There is little attempt to go into any more detail. 
(In contrast, many of the documents, particularly 
those setting out statutory requirements for the 
mainstream subjects, have gone into considerable 
detail about what is to be taught on a more factual 
level.) 
So far, then, the move towards a National 
Curriculum for schools has resulted in what 
might to be argued to be little more than gestures 
towards the importance of dealing with values 
within the school curriculum. 
One measure of how seriously a commitment 
towards any form of values education is taken 
might be the extent to which teachers are to be 
trained to deal with questions of values in their 
teaching. Here again, so far as central initiatives 
are concerned there has been little more than a 
paper acknowledgement of the issues, and even 
that appears, at the time of writing, to be due for 
further dilution. For the past few years, a set of 
criteria for the accreditation of courses of teacher 
education (via CATE, the Council for the 
Accreditation of Teacher Education) has been in 
force. These criteria are rather like the 
requirements of the National Curriculum itself, in 
that the need for teachers to deal with questions 
of values is recognised, but is not given great 
weight or much specification. On completion of 
their course, the criteria state, students should be 
able to incorporate in their teaching cross-
curricular dimensions (e.g. equal opportunities, 
multicultural education and personal and social 
education); and they should be able to teach 
controversial issues in a balanced way (DES 
Circular 24/89: Initial Teacher Training: 
Approval of Courses). 
It was always the case that in trying to meet these 
aims in the preparation of teachers, institutions 
would be labouring under pressure of time and of 
many other competing aims. More recently it 
appears that attempts to prepare teachers to 
engage in any serious values education will be 
still more severely constrained. On both sides of 
the political spectrum there is agreement that a 
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higher proportion of teacher training than has 
been the case should be carried out in schools; for 
the present Conservative government, the 
Secretary of State for Education has announced 
(January 1992) that this proportion should be 
80%. The primary intention is that teachers 
should be as well prepared as possible in the 
competences of classroom teaching, which is 
assumed to be in their subject specialism; an 
inevitable side-effect, whether intended or not, is 
that there will be less time available for any 
studies which are aimed at giving teachers either 
a more theoretical or even simply a broader basis 
for their work. Consistently with this, it is no 
surprise that new criteria for teacher training are 
to be produced which will say still less, if 
anything at all, about teacher's responsibilities 
and capacities in the area of values education. 
Perhaps one lesson that can be drawn from 
current trends is that, if there is to be a place in 
teacher education for an input from specialists 
who are not themselves classroom teachers, that 
role will not be primarily in equipping teachers 
with classroom competences. Politically the 
decision appears to have been made that this is 
the role of the schools. In the limited time 
available in any course of teacher education, a 
specialist input would do well to concentrate on 
something which otherwise would not 
provided at all. 
The current British context, then, in terms both 
curriculum and of teacher education, does 
encourage optimism about values education in 
schools. Yet this is in a wider context in which 
both politicians and members of the public 
often suggest that schools are partly ,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,oi 
for what are seen as the moral ills society. 
Schools may be seen as doing too little for 
moral and civic development of their pupils; 
the 1988 Education Reform Act itself required 
the school curriculum must 'promote 
spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and ph 
development of pupils at the school and 
society'. It would see that a heavy burden is 
being placed on teachers, of a responsibility for 
the moral good of their pupils and the s 
which extends far beyond their competence as 
teachers of their subject; but that, on current 
trends, the education of teachers will include less 
and less preparation for this role. 
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To repeat, what can teacher education do to 
prepare teachers to play at least some worthwhile 
part in values education? I shall suggest that, on 
certain conceptions of values education, there is 
in fact very little that can be done; but that there is 
another, and very important, aspect of values 
education which does offer more hope. 
Much that has been written on values education, 
more specifically under the heading of 'moral 
education', has been concerned with the 
development of a range of dispositions and 
competences on the part of individuals. There 
have been approaches which see moral education 
primarily as the teaching of a certain form of 
reasoning (associated, for instance, with the name 
of John Wilson in Britain and with Lawrence 
Kohlberg in the USA, though Kohlberg hims~lf 
preferred to speak of 'cognitive stimulation' 
rather than teaching). The intention of such 
approaches has been to equip individuals to make 
their own moral judgements, in a way that is both 
autonomous and rational, without 
predetermining what judgements they would 
make. Such approaches have been criticised, and 
more recently the tide seems to be turning 
towards an approach which, often referring to 
Aristotle, emphasises that what most of all have 
to be developed are appropriate dispositions that 
are as much emotional as cognitive - in short, 
virtues. 
Neither of these approaches seems at present to 
offer a realistic possibility for values education in 
schools of a form which teachers could be trained 
to deliver. The more 'rationalist' or 'cognitive' 
approach does, certainly, hold out the possibility 
of systematic programmes of education in moral 
reasoning being worked out, and if there were 
such a systematic programme, teachers could be 
trained to teach it. But (leaving aside 
philosophical questions about the 
appropriateness of such an approach), the 
development of the National Curriculum has so 
much concentrated attention on the teaching of a 
(rather traditional) list of core subjects that the 
insertion of what would be virtually a new subject 
is not for the foreseeable future a realistic option. 
The problem with the 'development of virtues' 
approach is different: even supposing there were 
general agreement on the qualities to be 
developed, we have too little idea of how to go 
about promoting such development. Perhaps 
there is no systematic programme that could be 
developed; surely a lot must depend on home' 
environment and peer group relationships; and in 
so far as a child's moral development in this sense 
depends on teachers at all, it may be a matter of 
the example a teacher sets. The effect of example 
may not itself be predictable, but may depend on 
some little understood interaction between the 
Vol. 17, No. 1,1992 
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characteristics of a particular teacher and 
particular child. Whether teachers can be trained, 
or even selected, to be moral exemplars is very 
doubtful; and if there were a form of initial 
teacher education that would have predictable 
success in turning out teachers of good moral 
character, it would surely have to be different 
from the current courses which concentrate 
almost wholly on instilling certain competences. 
In the present context, then, whatever can be done 
by way of preparing teachers to contribute to 
values education, will have to be done in a way 
that can be fitted in to the primary political 
concern of preparing teachers to deliver a set 
curriculum. But there is a possibility that builds 
on that primary concern. Even if the 
development of moral qualities in individuals is 
something which the education system as 
presently constituted can hardly tackle in any 
deliberate way at all, there is another aspect of 
values education, which depends on recognising 
the extent to which values, especially in a 
complex and pluralist society, are both subject 
matter and ingredient of public debate. At 
present much public debate on matters of values 
hardly goes beyond the level of assertion and 
coun ter-assertion; ra tionally-demons tra ted 
positions, reasoned consensus, and 
understanding of the positions of others are all 
less in evidence than they might be. I think it will 
hardly be disputed (and is not out of line with the 
professed aims of the Education Reform Act) that 
to enable citizens of a democratic and pluralist 
society to engage in a reasoned way on debate 
about value issues which are of public importance 
could be a proper educational aim. And, 
fortunately, it is not unrealistic to think that 
teachers can be enabled to make a positive 
contribution in this area. 
It will be helpful here to give some examples of 
the sorts of issue I have in mind. As it happens, 
within the context of recent curriculum 
developments in Britain, such issues come up 
often within the cross-curricular themes already 
mentioned. That is not to say that they come up 
only here; but anyone concerned with values 
education has pragmatic reason for building on 
what is already to hand. (A principle that could 
apply in other countries, though the illustration I 
go on to give is specific to recent British 
developments.) The cross-curricular themes are 
to hand and do have official recognition, even 
though not statutory force. It will be useful, then, 
to list some of the questions of values which are 
already recognised in this context, under the 
headings of the cross-curricular themes in which 
they come up. 
9 
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Economic and Industrial Understanding 
One topic recognised under these theme is the 
distribution of wealth. In a national, a European 
and a world context it will become clear to pupils 
that there are great disparities in the material 
conditions of life. This raises questions about 
justice, both within a society and between nations. 
Is a situation in which some people have more 
than others automatically unjust? What 
determines whether a situation is just or unjust? 
Environmental Education 
Many of the NC documents on particular subjects 
have anticipated the idea of environmental 
education as a cross-curricular theme; as one 
would expect, the documents on science, 
technology and geography are well aware of 
environmental issues. Often, one finds a 
reference to environmental consequences and 
factors which have to be considered in addition to 
others, including ethical ones (for some reason the 
term 'ethical' is commoner than 'moral'). But this 
is misleading in its suggestion that environmental 
questions do not already contain questions of 
values. Here is one deep and central one: Are all 
of the moral questions about how we are to treat 
the environment questions about how other 
human beings, both now and in the future, will be 
affected? Or are the effects on non-human 
animals also morally relevant? And further, are 
effects on the non-sentient environment morally 
relevant in their own right? Can there be 
anything wrong in irreversibly altering the natural 
environment, when effects on sentient beings are 
put on one side? 
Citizenship 
Here it seems hardly necessary to demonstrate 
that moral issues are raised. Let me take just one 
or two examples involving the political activity of 
voting. Should citizens see voting or not voting 
as a matter simply of individual preference, or 
should they consider themselves to have a duty to 
vote (this being a question of moral duty in a 
country such as Britain where there is no legal 
compulsion to vote)? And when they do vote, 
should each voter see her decision in terms of 
what will be best for herself, or in terms of what 
will be best for the society as a whole - or indeed 
for a still wider community? That is an issue 
about a political process; but any issue of public 
moral concern is presumably relevant to the 
theme of citizenship. 
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Health Education; Careers Education and 
Guidance 
These remaining two cross-curricular themes 
from the NCe's list are at first sight different, in 
that they are less concerned with public moral 
issues and more with individual choice. For the 
most part the underlying thinking behind the 
NCC guidance on these themes seems to be that 
pupils should be enabled to make their own 
informed choices. I say 'for the most 
because there are some matters where it is taken 
to be the school's responsibility to promote a 
particular substantive value, beyond, that is, the 
value to the individual of making her own 
choices, e.g. from the Health Education guidance, 
'The principal objective of family life education is 
that pupils understand and value the central role 
of the family as an institution' (p. 4). But for 
most part the emphasis is on individual choice. 
This does not mean, however, that such choice is 
to take place without moral parameters, or 
the parameters are not debatable. There are, 
instance, possible choices of lifestyle which 
predictably will call down moral disapprobation 
from at least some quarters; and questions 
the way in which one individual who would 
make a certain choice for herself is to 
another who does make that choice, e.g. to take 
example which could well come up under the sex 
education aspect of health education, how is 
person to view the choice of another to go in 
prostitution? Is that activity to be viewed as 
legitimate part of a free-market pr,em,nIT' 
hence a legitimate choice - given suitable 
precautions? Notice here that what can be 
as a question of individual choice can also 
as a question of public morality. And on 
more generally, is it morally indifferent 
an individual chooses to earn a living: in one 
the health care professions; in the production 
marketing of some rather useless but 
profitable luxury consumer goods; in 
manufacture of armaments; as a soldier? 
In these examples, which could readily 
multiplied, we have a considerable variety 
questions, so far as their subject matter 
concerned, but they all involve moral questions 
or if it is reckoned in a particular case that 
moral issue is raised, that will itself be ueUdllau" 
I submit that a rational exploration of 
this context, must involve considering 
across differences in subject matter. It is 
plausible, either in the thought of one rlhrirll1al;' 
or across society, that values come 
compartments that happen to coincide with 
categorisations made by the NCC - one set 
values where health is concerned, another where 
the environment is concerned, etc. But if rational 
comparisons are to be made, it seems there must 
be some common currency in which this can be 
done - some kind of common vocabulary or 
conceptual scheme which cuts across differences 
in subject matter. 
Consider the comparison with the rather 
traditional National Curriculum foundation 
subjects. To teach a subject to the point where 
rational discussion can go on within it is, to quite 
an extent, to teach a language or a set of concepts. 
Of course, in geography, history, the sciences etc. 
there is a good deal of information to be 
assimilated, but the information, if it is to be made 
use of in a geographical, historical etc. context, 
will be framed within some recognisable 
vocabulary which will be to a degree a specialist 
one. (A point not neglected by the expert 
committees charged with drawing up syllabuses, 
even if it has been missed by some politicians.) I 
want to ask whether there is a common currency 
for discussion of values. 
Readers of Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) might well 
return a negative answer. At the beginning of 
After Virtue he cites some familiar examples of 
moral disagreement within our culture - about 
abortion, the use of nuclear weapons, the justice 
of redistributive economic policies (notice, by the 
way, that each of these could well arise in the 
context of one or other of the cross-curricular 
themes). MacIntyre says that because conflicting 
positions on these issues are not ones that fall 
within a single moral tradition, there is no 
rational way of resolving them. The disputes 
arise because different traditions - or fragments of 
traditions - clash, and there is no common ground 
to which protagonists of different positions can 
appeal. 
Should we conclude that there is no future for 
rational discussion of moral issues in schools? I 
think not, even if MacIntyre is right. MacIntyre 
claims that our culture has no way of reaching a 
rational resolution of these disputes - in other 
words there can be, within our culture, no right 
answer. But the aim in an educational context 
does not have to be to arrive at a right answer. In 
that sense I would certainly not claim that 
discussion of moral values will ever be like school 
mathematics. There could be an aim of trying to 
arrive at a working agreement for practical 
purposes, but that would be a further 
development, which I have explored elsewhere 
(Haydon, G., 1986); my argument here does not 
depend on it. For the moment my question is 
Vol. 17, No. 1,1992 
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simply whether there can be a common language 
in which moral values can be explored and 
discussed. 
In the case of history, geography, science and the 
rest, if we can speak of a common language of 
discourse it is because we can refer to along-
standing well established practice. In the case of 
issues of values we do have such a long-standing 
well-established practice, and it would be foolish 
to ignore what it can offer. The practice, and the 
language, are those of moral and political 
philosophy. The picking out of philosophy here, 
m preference to other academic traditions which 
do also have things to say about values, is 
deliberate. One could look instead to theology, 
but any particular theological tradition will rest 
on presuppositions which are too substantive to 
furnish a language in which the range of value 
positions in multi-faith culture could be 
compared and debated. Sociology has a lot to say 
by way of explaining why people in particular 
groups tend to hold the values they do; but in an 
educational context an exploration of why people 
hold their different values, while it might in itself 
be illuminating, would be only a starting point for 
an exploration of the values themselves. 
Psychology has a lot to offer too, but much of the 
psychology of moral values has taken a 
developmental line which will be more relevant 
where development of individual capacities and 
dispositions is the aim than where the concern is 
a rational investigation and comparison of 
competing standpoints. Take Kohlberg's 
developmental scheme, for instance. If we wish 
people to be able to have serious debate about 
their values, the ability to categorise certain 
positions as being at, say, Stage 3 and others as 
Stage 4, is at worst invidious and at best 
irrelevant. 
No doubt there is more to be said about the 
resources offered by alternative academic fields of 
enquiry, but let me now say something positive in 
favour of philosophy. MacIntyre is right, of 
course, that there are very different traditions 
reflected within moral and political philosophy. 
But the point is that philosophy itself gives us a 
language within which to talk about the 
differences. I would suggest that some of the 
most well-worn distinctions are still some of the 
most useful. 
Let me look back at my earlier examples. First I 
mentioned questions about justice, both within a 
society and between societies. A lot of recent 
moral philosophy has pretty thoroughly explored 
various approaches to justice - appeals to utility, 
11 
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to rights, to hypothetical contract. MacIntyre is 
quite right to point out that the positions of Rawls 
and Nozick are a kind of formalisation of 
positions that are found in popular consciousness 
(After Virtue, ch. 17). What I want to add is that to 
be able to see current differences over 
re distributive justice in terms of the 
Rawls/Nozick debate - to mention just one 
debate that is relevant - while it certainly doesn't 
bring one closer to a 'right answer', does take one 
a long step towards clarifying the differences and 
seeing them for what they are. 
I mentioned then values issues concerning the 
environment. Fundamental here, I think, is the 
question whether the only intelligible values are, 
in the end, human centred. If they are, or even if 
they are centred more widely on sentient 
inhabitants of the Earth, then in an environmental 
context a large step has already been taken 
towards a utilitarian ethic. If the relevant values 
are not solely anthropocentric, what basis is there 
for them? There is scope here for the exploration 
of theologically based positions of various kinds; 
and also for the idea that environmental concerns 
somehow demand a radically new kind of ethic 
(on which I would suggest that until we have 
some informed acquaintance with existing 
varieties of ethical outlook, we are in no position 
to recognise whether something new is needed). 
On citizenship, it will perhaps not need spelling 
out that once one tries to explore very far a whole 
range of value issues concerning the relation 
between the individual, the society and the state, 
one will soon come to questions about appeals to 
utility or appeals to rights, and to concerns of a 
more Aristotelian or communitarian kind - all of 
them very much already in the arena in our 
culture, even if not always recognised under this 
terminology. 
I said that both in Health Education and Careers 
Education the idea of individual choice loomed 
large. If choice is to be informed, it can be 
informed not only by factual information but also 
by understanding of the sorts of value perspective 
which can be seen to bear on the choice. (Without 
this understanding, the emphasis on choice can 
seem to support a radical subjectivism about 
values which undermines the possibility of 
serious public debate.) The utilitarian tradition, 
which has been influential on the legislation of 
liberal societies, holds that the only reason for 
condemnation of a practice which an individual 
might wish to choose is the prevention of harm to 
others. There is also a strong strand in liberal 
theory which puts great weight on consent. From 
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the point of view of both these traditions, there 
may be no moral objection at all to practices 
which involve only consenting adults and bring 
about no harm to others - though if there is a 
danger of harm to the consenting adUlts 
themselves, the traditions may diverge on the 
degree of paternalism countenanced. But of 
course an exploration of values must include the 
exploration of values which are not rooted in an 
utilitarian and liberal tradition, and must be able 
to talk about the moral objections which 
people do feel to, say, prostitution 
homosexuality (separately or together). Within 
philosophical literature there is scope, for 
instance, for exploring the idea that certain 
practices are unnatural - what is to count as 
natural? (a question which also arises from a 
different perspective within environmental 
concerns). And what of the idea of respect for 
persons? Is the Kantian idea that a person must 
be respected, which involves never treating him 
or her solely as a means, congruent with the idea 
that it doesn't matter what you do to a person so 
long as he or she consents? In the context of 
career choice, what of the related Kantian idea 
that one has a duty to develop one's talents? How 
much restriction does this put on the utilitarian-
liberal idea that individual preference is 
paramount? And what again of the idea that the 
full flourishing of human beings, in their working 
activity as well as in their leisure, lies in the social 
nature of human beings, so that doing a job, or a 
certain sort of job, may in part constitute a 
person's identity and membership of a 
community, rather than being simply a means 
towards independent ends? 
My suggestion is, then, that the Western tradition 
of moral and political philosophy contains a rich 
store of ideas, concepts and arguments which can 
help to make sense of and bring some order into 
the 'exploration of values'. But just how, if it is 
right, can this argument be of help in educational 
practice? Am I suggesting that all school pupils 
should be educated in moral and political 
philosophy? 
There is a case that could be made for that, but it 
would be hard to convince people of it at a time 
when the National Curriculum itself has put so 
much pressure on people's time and energy in 
delivering what has to be delivered. Certainly 
schools, in considering how to deliver adequately 
on the cross-curricular themes, could usefully 
consider the possibility of devoting some time 
with students, even if only 40 minutes a week in 
certain years, to a directly focused and 
deliberately cross-curricular look at values. But 
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even that modest proposal would need teachers 
able to handle it in a productive way. And 
teachers and their own preparation are the focus 
of concern here. NCC documents constantly refer 
to the need for cross-curricular planning if the 
whole curriculum is to be successful. So, we have 
to envisage that teachers whose own base is in the 
sciences, history, maths, English, etc. sit down 
together to see where and how certain ideas are to 
be got across and considered. Among these 
concerns will be - or should be - values. It is at 
this stage, most of all, that a common currency of 
debate would surely be valuable. What prospect 
will there be of pupils doing anything more than 
engaging in an exchange of personal points of 
view - without further examination and reflection 
- if teachers themselves do not have the language 
in which they can recognise the kinds of views 
that are being brought forward; see where there 
are links that can be made with issues that might 
come up in some quite different part of the 
curriculum; and see where there are lines of 
approach which are important with the society 
even though they might happen to be missed 
within the particular composition of a class? 
Does this mean a training in moral and political 
philosophy for all teachers? Again, there could be 
a strong case for that, but in the present climate is 
over-ambitious. There is no need to aim at 
equipping every teacher to consider all the 
arguments put forward by professional 
philosophers and to come to his or her own value 
position on every issue. But there is a more 
modest aim which should not be impracticable: 
to introduce teachers to the kind of language and 
conceptual systems which I have been referring 
to, to the point where teachers are able to use this 
language in their own curriculum planning and, 
where appropriate, in their teaching. This would 
perhaps best be done, not in distinct courses, but 
in the process of equipping teachers to handle the 
ki~d: of value issues which will come up both 
wIthm the teaching of their own subjects and in 
their contribution to the teaching of cross-
curricular themes. Teachers preparing to teach 
different subjects can be brought together during 
their initial training, to work out how these cross-
subject areas of the curriculum could be handled. 
!hi~ n~ed not happen within separate training 
InstItutIons; there would be a lot to be said for its 
taking place in schools. But wherever the 
location, people would be needed with the 
relevant knowledge and experience who could 
show student teachers that there is a systematic 
Way of approaching the value issues which arise, 
so that they are not left to have to rely on their 
Own background assumptions or whatever they 
Vol. 17, No. 1,1992 
AlIstralian JOllmal oJTeacher Education 
may have picked up during their own education. 
Here, if anywhere, is a matter on which theorists _ 
even if they are closer to philosophy than to the 
classroom - have an irreplaceable contribution to 
make. This is not an element of the education of 
teachers which existing classroom practitioners 
can supply, since it has, in almost all cases, been 
lacking from the education of those practitioners 
themselves. 
In a published lecture, MacIntyre (1987) has asked 
whether there could in modern conditions be an 
educated public, and concluded that there could 
not. Given his definition of an educated public, 
he was quite right; for him an educated public 
would have to share - as a result of their 
education - a single moral-philosophical tradition 
(utilitarianism, say, or Catholicism) which would 
set the parameters of their debate on public 
issues. But in a less demanding and more realistic 
- though still ambitious - sense, perhaps we need 
not yet give up on the idea of an educated public 
as a public sharing a political and civic culture in 
which value issues would be debated - and they 
would always remain debatable - in terms of a 
shared understanding of what the issues are and 
a shared vocabulary for dealing with them. And 
teachers would actually be the bearers of this 
common culture. That seems to me a worthwhile 
vision. And though there has been little detail 
about the content of teacher education in this 
paper, the conclusion is inescapable that if there is 
any prospect of bringing that vision into contact 
~ith present-d~y reality - the reality which 
mcludes the NatIOnal Curriculum and any likely 
dev~lopments from it - that prospect will only be 
realIsed through teacher education. 
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